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Abstract 
Using nationally representative survey data for Finnish employees linked to register data on their wages 
and work histories we find wage effects of high involvement management (HIM) practices are generally 
positive and significant. However, employees with better wage and work histories are more likely to 
enter HIM jobs. The wage premium falls substantially having accounted for employees‟ work histories 
suggesting that existing studies‟ estimates are upwardly biased due to positive selection into HIM. 
Results do not differ significantly when using propensity score matching as opposed to standard 
regression techniques. The premium rises with the number of HIM practices and differs markedly 
across different types of HIM practice.  
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1.  Introduction 
In recent decades many employers have introduced practices designed to maximise employees' sense of 
involvement with their work, and their commitment to the wider organisation, in the expectation that 
this will improve their organisation's performance. These “high involvement practices” include teams, 
problem-solving groups, information sharing, incentive pay, and supportive practices such as good 
training and associated recruitment methods. Collectively they constitute “high involvement 
management” (HIM). There is a sizeable literature exploring the links between these practices and firm 
performance (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010) but less is known about the effects of HIM on employees‟ 
pay. If the practices make workers more productive we might expect this to lead to higher pay. 
However, HIM may be positively correlated with higher pay if high ability workers are matched to HIM 
workplaces. This may occur if, for example, firms require higher ability workers to maximise returns 
from their investment in HIM. Accordingly, if one is unable to control for worker sorting by ability, 
estimates of HIM‟s impact on employees‟ wages are likely to be upwardly biased. 
 
We contribute to the literature in three ways. First, we establish whether higher ability workers are more 
likely to use high involvement practices in their jobs. We do so by linking register data on Finnish 
workers‟ wage and work histories to a survey in which employees identify which, if any, high 
involvement practices they are exposed to in their jobs. Second, we calculate the wage returns to HIM 
practices in HIM jobs having controlled for worker sorting. We do so by conditioning on work and 
wage histories, and by matching HIM with non-HIM employees on the basis of their prior labour 
market experiences. Third, we estimate the expected wage returns to HIM among employees not 
currently exposed to them. As we discuss, this may offer insights into why it is that HIM is not as 
prevalent as early advocates had anticipated. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section Two reviews the theoretical and empirical 
literatures linking HIM to employees‟ wages. Section Three introduces our data. Section Four outlines 
the theoretical framework underpinning our investigation and the empirical strategy we adopt. Section 
Five reports our results and Section Six concludes. 
 
2.  Theoretical and Empirical Literatures 
There are four reasons why one might expect HIM to improve labour productivity and thus employees‟ 
wages. First, learning to use high involvement practices entails building firm-specific human capital. 
This skill acquisition can entail on-the-job and off-the-job training resulting in higher labour 
productivity. This is why training is usually treated as a necessary pre-condition for the success of HIM 
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(Appelbaum et al., 2000). Second, increased job autonomy and the devolution of decision-making 
responsibilities to employees allows them to utilise their tacit knowledge of the labour and production 
processes to improve their productive capacity in a way that is not possible when they simply 
implement the job tasks allocated to them by managers and supervisors. The idea that HIM turns 
employees from „passive‟ to „active‟ participants in the production process is at the heart of HIM as 
conceived by the Harvard School (Beer et al., 1984). Third, the shift to team-based production which 
often accompanies high involvement strategies can raise labour productivity where collaborators‟ 
labour inputs are complementary. Fourth, HIM can elicit greater employee effort via labour 
intensification (Ramsey et al., 2000) or the motivational effects of higher job satisfaction or 
organizational commitment which may accompany job enrichment (Walton, 1985). Furthermore, there 
are usually greater incentives to increase effort under HIM because output is often linked to 
performance. One of the threats to HIM is the “1/N” problem whereby workers choose to free-ride 
on the efforts of their colleagues in the knowledge that this may only have a marginal impact on total 
team production. However, empirical studies have found that when team-based production is 
underpinned by group-based performance pay employees co-monitor one another‟s efforts to minimise 
the problem (Freeman et al., 2010).  
 
There are at least three other reasons to expect firms to raise their wages on adopting HIM which are 
not directly linked to increased worker productivity. The first is rent sharing. If labour productivity 
improvements exceed the costs of introducing and maintaining HIM, the firm will increase profits 
which it may share with employees – provided employees have sufficient bargaining power to extract a 
share of these additional rents.1 HIM employers may also raise their wages above those offered in the 
market to reduce quit rates in order to ensure that they recoup the full value of their investments in 
HIM. In this case higher wages are paid for efficiency wage reasons. Finally higher wages in HIM firms 
may reflect compensating wage differentials since workers may demand a wage premium to 
compensate for the disutility arising from the additional employee responsibilities that accompany high 
involvement practices. Since HIM can also be thought of as a mechanism by which firms share the risk 
of production with employees (via devolved responsibilities for decision-making and performance-
based pay) this may also result in a compensating differential. 
 
                                                 
1 Whether HIM employees have more or less bargaining power than „like‟ employees that are not exposed to HIM is 
uncertain, a priori. Firms may become more reliant on incumbent workers if the firm-specific human capital required to 
organise HIM production is costly to acquire. Firms may thus face hold-up problems if HIM employees wish to challenge 
the firm‟s wage policy, a problem that may be particularly acute where HIM accompanies Just-in-Time production (JIT) in 
which inventory stocks are low and supply chains entail interdependence between firms (Wood and Bryson, 2009). On the 
other hand, if employees‟ acquisition of firm-specific HIM skills is at the expense of investment in transferable skills the 
market value of those skills may limit the wages they can command outside the firm. 
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The seven mechanisms linking HIM to higher pay enumerated above start from the premise that 
employees in HIM firms will be paid higher wages than they would in „like‟ firms without HIM, either 
because their labour productivity rises or because the employer raises the wage for other related reasons 
(rent sharing, efficiency wages, or compensating differentials). However, one must account for the 
possibility that worker sorting may induce a correlation between HIM and higher pay which is not 
causal. This may occur if unobservable differences between HIM and non-HIM workers are correlated 
with wages. High ability workers may sort into HIM if “good” workers have a lower disutility of effort 
(Lazear, 2000). Alternatively, if more able workers produce more output for the same level of effort, 
this will result in higher pay in workplaces offering the incentive contracts that often accompany HIM 
(Prendergast, 1999). If employers have a queue of workers to choose from when filling HIM job slots it 
is likely that they will choose the high ability workers with the skills and aptitude necessary to meet the 
challenges inherent in high involvement practices. Job candidates signal their ability to prospective 
employers through their work and earnings histories. These constitute a credible signal, because it is 
costly for a worker to acquire a “good” work history. When histories are unobservable to the analyst – 
as is usually the case – estimated wage returns to exposure to HIM will be upwardly biased since the 
workers engaged in high involvement practices are drawn from the upper reaches of the ability 
spectrum and thus would receive higher wages even in the absence of HIM. 
 
This characterisation of the job market, in which there are two sectors (HIM and non-HIM), worker 
heterogeneity characterised in terms of worker ability, and a „double‟ selection process in which workers 
queue for jobs and employers pick workers from the queue, is akin to the model Abowd and Farber 
(1982) and Farber (1983) use to explain the distribution of worker talent in the union and non-union 
sectors of the economy. In their model workers in the lower part of the potential wage distribution 
queue for union jobs and union employers pick the best from that queue. As a consequence it is 
workers in the middle of the ability spectrum who are found in union jobs. In our setting, it is the high 
ability workers who queue for HIM jobs and, because HIM employers choose the best workers from 
the queue, it is those workers with the highest potential earnings who are found in HIM jobs.2  
 
Empirical evidence in respect of HIM effects on wages is mixed. Some studies find a positive 
relationship (eg. Appelbaum et al., 2000; Hamilton et al., 2003; Helper et al., 1993; Forth and Millward, 
2004; Handel and Levine, 2006; Osterman, 2006); some find positive and negative effects (eg. Handel 
and Gittleman, 2004); while others find no significant effects (eg. Black et al., 2004). Reviewing the 
                                                 
2 The queue for HIM jobs arises because the demand for HIM jobs exceeds its supply due to the fixed costs employers face 
in adopting HIM. These costs of switching to HIM create „stickiness‟ such that HIM diffusion is patchy (Bryson et al., 
2007). 
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studies using data through to the late 1990s Handel and Levine (2004) conclude that nationally 
representative surveys tend to find no effects of HIM on wages, whereas industry- or firm-specific 
studies tend to find larger positive effects. This difference may arise either because the latter are better 
able to control for measurement error associated with heterogeneity across firms or difficulties in 
capturing HIM practices. Alternatively, HIM effects may be heterogeneous across firms or industries 
and those firms and industries which have attracted researchers‟ attention may be those where HIM 
effects may be anticipated, thus making it difficult to extrapolate from these results to the population as 
a whole.  
 
One Finnish study (Kalmi and Kauhanen, 2008) using the 2003 Quality of Working Life Survey 
(QWLS) which forms part of the data we use in this paper, found HIM effects on wages varied 
markedly across different types of HIM practice. However, their study, in common with the other 
studies to date, lacked longitudinal data on employees necessary to adequately account for worker 
selection into HIM when estimating HIM‟s effects on wages.3 As noted in the introduction, we 
overcome this problem by linking register data on Finnish workers‟ wage and work histories to a survey 
in which employees identify which, if any, high involvement practices they are exposed to in their jobs. 
We are thus able to calculate the wage returns to HIM practices in HIM jobs having controlled for 
worker sorting by conditioning on work and wage histories. As well as introducing these work and 
wage histories into regression analyses, we use them to match HIM employees with non-HIM 
employees with similar characteristics using propensity score matching (PSM) methods. These 
matching estimators enable us to recover not only the effects of HIM on the wages of workers exposed 
to them, but also the expected wage returns to HIM among employees not currently exposed to them. 
 
3.  Data 
Our data are the Quality of Work Life Survey (QWLS) 2003 of Statistics Finland (SF). The initial 
sample for QWLS is derived from a monthly Labour Force Survey (LFS), where a random sample of 
the working age population is selected for a telephone interview. The 2003 QWLS was based on LFS 
respondents in October and November who were 15-64-year-old wage and salary earners with a normal 
weekly working time of at least five hours. 5270 individuals were selected for the QWLS sample and 
invited to participate in a personal face-to-face interview. Out of this sample, 4104 persons or around 
78 percent participated (Lehto and Sutela, 2005) in the interviews, which took place mostly in October-
                                                 
3 Kalmi and Kauhanen (2008: 442) say "A potential shortcoming of the data is that they are cross-sectional. Panel data on 
individuals would allow unobservable time-invariant heterogeneity and selection issues to be addressed. However, panel data 
on individuals are rare, partly due to confidentiality issues. We are not aware of any research on the impact of HPWS that 
uses panel data on individuals.” In fact, there are some exceptions which are usually firm case studies focussing on incentive 
pay and financial participation, eg. Renaud et al (2004). 
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December 2003, with some taking place in the beginning of January 2004. Owing to missing 
information on some variables for some workers, the sample size used in this study is 3782 
observations.  
 
In addition to the HIM practices the worker is exposed to in her employment (discussed below) the 
QWLS contains information on the type of job the employee does and the nature of the employer, 
together with employees‟ personal characteristics and work experience. SF supplements QWLS with 
information from the LFS on, for example, working time and labour market status, and information on 
annual earnings from tax registers and on education (level and field) from the register of degrees 
earned. Supplementary information on the industry and location of the employer is gathered from 
various other registers maintained by SF.  
 
The QWLS data is a cross-section data set that includes only limited self-reported information on past 
labour market experience. However, we match the QWLS data to longitudinal register data. These are 
the Finnish Longitudinal Employer-Employee Data (FLEED). FLEED is constructed from a number 
of different registers on individuals and firms that are maintained by Statistics Finland. In particular, 
FLEED contains information from Employment Statistics, which records each employee‟s employer 
during the last week of each year. We match QWLS and FLEED using unique personal identifiers (i.e. 
ID codes for persons). We have followed the employees over the period 1990-2003. In each year, we 
can link information on the firm and establishment to each person.  
 
Following Kalmi and Kauhanen (2008) we capture four different aspects of HIM. Self-managed teams 
are defined as teams that select their own foremen and decide on the internal division of 
responsibilities. A dummy variable for information sharing equals one if employees are informed about 
the changes at work at the planning stage rather than shortly before the change or at its 
implementation. A dummy for training equals one if the employee has participated in employer-
provided training during the past 12 months. A dummy for incentive pay equals one if the individual is 
personally subject to performance-related pay.  
 
If HIM practices are complementary (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995) it may be that productivity and thus 
wage effects are more clearly discernible when HIM practices are combined. Again, following Kalmi 
and Kauhanen (2008) we examine the joint effects of management practices with a high performance 
work system (HPWS) dummy variable which equals one if more than one of the HIM practices (self-
managed teams, information sharing, employer-provided training or incentive pay) is present. In 
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addition we construct variables not tested by Kalmi and Kauhanen (2008). First, we construct count 
variables for having one, at least two, at least three, or all four HIM practices. Second we construct a set 
of dummy variables which identify specific combinations of HIM which are significant either because 
they are common in the data or of theoretical significance. They include four HIM bundles 
incorporating incentive pay, the rationale being that if HIM wage effects are associated with greater 
worker effort or motivational effects, one might anticipate these will be larger in the presence of 
incentive pay.  
 
The work history variables include the number of past job switches (defined as a change of 
establishment), unemployment episodes (both number of episodes and their length in months), past 
employment months, an indicator for having worked in a big firm (firm with more than 300 
employees), length of tenure with current employer, past average earnings (1990-2001) and past 
earnings growth (average over periods 1999-2000 and 2000-2001). As part of sensitivity analyses, we 
add controls for past socio-economic status (dummies for lower white-collar and upper white-collar 
employees in 2000, with blue-collars as the reference group). All of the above work history variables are 
from the longitudinal register data. In addition, we use information in QWLS to form an indicator for 
persons who have had more than three different professions over their working life. 
 
The inclusion of a wage growth variable in models estimating the probability of being exposed to HIM 
practices is prompted by the possibility that workers may be able to signal their quality to employers 
not only through their past mean earnings, but also their recent wage profile. Indeed, employers may 
give particular weight to evidence of recent earnings growth. If job applicants are successful in 
signalling their quality to employers in this way one might anticipate a positive effect of recent wage 
growth on the propensity to enter HIM workplaces over and above the effect of average wages over 
one‟s prior work history. This is, in a sense, the opposite of the Ashenfelter Dip apparent in the welfare 
evaluation literature whereby those entering welfare programmes have particularly poor earnings 
trajectories prior to programme entry relative to seemingly „like‟ individuals who do not enter the 
programme (Ashenfelter, 1978). In the welfare evaluation literature failure to account for the „dip‟ may 
upwardly bias estimates of programme effects on subsequent earnings since some of the wage recovery 
associated with regression to the mean might otherwise be attributed to the programme. In the case of 
HIM, failure to account for the upward trajectory of wages for those entering HIM jobs may 
downwardly bias estimates of HIM effects on subsequent earnings since reversion to mean wages 
subsequently implies a reduction in wage growth which would erroneously be attributed to the 
programme. 
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Turning to our dependent variable, earnings in 2003, we have two sources of data. The first is the log 
of annual earnings from the register data. Earnings include the base wage, overtime pay, bonuses, and 
wage supplements. The bonuses and wage supplements are determined at the establishment level, 
whereas collective (industry-level) bargaining sets a floor for the base pay. The second measure is the 
log of self-reported wages from the QWLS based on midpoints of monthly wage bands. We prefer the 
register measure since it is continuous and is less prone to reporting error. However, we test the 
sensitivity of our results to the self-reported wage measure. 
 
We control for gender, age, marital status, educational level, union membership status, usual weekly 
hours worked, plant size, multi-plant firms, foreign ownership, industry (with fourteen dummy 
variables) and public sector employer. All of these variables are based on the data on individuals in 
QWLS. Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables are presented in Appendix Table 
A1 with those for the HIM variables presented in Appendix Table A2. 
 
4.  Model and Estimation 
To formalize the arguments, consider the simple model used in Lemieux et al. (2009). Their emphasis is 
on the sorting of employees to fixed wage and performance related pay (PRP) jobs, but the same 
arguments can be used also for other aspects of HIM. In their model the chief features that distinguish 
wage formation under PRP contracts from those under fixed wages are the fixed monitoring costs 
associated with PRP; higher returns to expected ability under PRP than fixed wages (explaining the 
sorting of high-ability workers into PRP contracts); and an error component linked to unobserved 
ability under PRP which is absent under fixed wages. 
 
Production of individual i in job (firm) j is given by 
 
(1)  yij = γ0j + γ1jeij 
 
where γ0j is output that is independent of effort, eij is effort and γ1j is marginal product of effort. Assume 
that workers are paid the value of production, so wij = yij. Utility is given by Uij = wij –exp(eij – i), where 
i is ability (or skills), which is normally distributed as i ~ N(i,i
2), conditionally on observed worker 
characteristics. Ability is revealed after the worker has taken up a job. To simplify the model, it can be 
assumed that the variance of ability is related to its mean by i
2 = i, where 0<<1.  
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Assume first that the distinction between HIM and non-HIM firms is in pay determination. As shown 
in Lemieux et al. (2009), in a fixed wage firm (which we interpret as a non-HIM firm) there is a contract 
with fixed wage and effort. The optimal, expected utility maximizing effort leads to wage (and output) 
 
(2)  wij
N = j + γ1j( – i
2) = j + γ1j(1 – )i 
 
where j = γ0j + γ1jlog(γ1j). In a firm with HIM (performance-based pay) the wage varies with effort. The 
worker chooses his effort after observing the realization of ability i. To set up the system (e.g. 
monitoring), there are fixed costs that are deducted from the pay. Given optimal effort, the expected 
wage is  
 
(3)  ij
HIM = j – μj + γ1j j  
 
where μj is the monitoring cost. The variance term cancels out in this case. 
 
The worker will choose between the fixed wage and performance pay jobs, based on a comparison of 
the utilities. The utility comparison, in turn, involves comparison of expected wages. This implies that a 
worker will choose a job in a firm with HIM, if ij
HIM > wij
N, or γ1ji – μj > γ1j(1–)i. This can be stated 
as i > μj/γ1j. One implication of the model is that higher ability workers will self-select into HIM 
firms, since they get a higher expected return to skills (the coefficient of  j is higher in HIM firms than 
in non-HIM firms) and for them the inequality is more likely to hold. Higher marginal productivity of 
effort, higher variance of ability, and lower monitoring costs increase the likelihood of choosing a HIM 
job. The model also has the implication that the returns to observable human capital will be larger in 
HIM than non-HIM jobs, since the coefficient of i is higher.
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There are other aspects of HIM systems besides performance-based pay. These can be illustrated with 
the same model. Working in a HIM firm may involve team work. This could be introduced into the 
model by making the assumption of higher productivity in team work than in non-team work, for 
                                                 
4
 This can be tested by including interactions of HIM with human capital (education) in the estimated model or, as we do 
later, by doing the analysis separately for different education levels. The model has also four other predictions that are more 
difficult to test with our data. First, the wage intercept should be lower in PRP (HIM) jobs than non-PRP (non-HIM) jobs 
because the firm factors in the costs of monitoring in the PRP case. This can be tested by looking at intercept in models 
where HIM is interacted with human capital, although the inclusion of other variables makes the prediction less clear. 
Second, the returns to unobservable ability will be larger in PRP than non-PRP jobs. Third, the returns to observable job 
characteristics will be smaller in PRP than non-PRP jobs. This would require interacting many of our control variables with 
HIM. Fourth, the variance of the firm-specific component in wages is smaller in PRP than non-PRP jobs. Since we do not 
have a large number of observations per firm, we cannot test this. 
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example. This would give an advantage to HIM jobs even in fixed-wage firms. However, perhaps the 
simplest way to illustrate this is to assume that the difference in team and non-team work is that in 
team work with group-based performance pay the cost of monitoring is lower, as the team members 
will monitor each other‟s effort. This has the straightforward implication that if a firm uses a bundle of 
HIM practices, performance-based pay and team work, the threshold for a worker to choose a job in 
such a firm will be lower, and the expected wage is higher than in a firm that uses just performance-
based pay. 
 
In the empirical analysis we run regressions of the following form: 
 
(4)  lnWi = Xiß + δHIMi + εi 
 
where X is a vector of observable characteristics of individuals and their employer with betas being 
coefficients to be estimated. We test the sensitivity of results to the inclusion of work history variables 
in the X vector. HIM captures the indicator of HIM which, as noted above, varies across specifications. 
The parameter δ represents the average proportional difference in wages between HIM and non-HIM 
workers adjusted for worker and workplace characteristics. εit is a random component. 
 
An alternative to OLS to control for bias on observables is the semi-parametric statistical matching 
approach known as propensity score matching (PSM) (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Heckman et al., 
1999) which compares wage outcomes for employees exposed to HIM with „matched‟ non-HIM 
employees. The method shares the causal identification assumption of the OLS in that it yields 
unbiased estimates of the treatment impact where differences between individuals affecting the 
outcome of interest are captured in their observed attributes. However, matching has three distinct 
advantages relative to regression in identifying an unbiased causal impact of HIM on wages. First, it is 
semi-parametric, so it does not require the assumption of linearity in the outcome equation. Second, it 
leaves the individual causal effect completely unrestricted so heterogeneous treatment effects are 
allowed for and no assumption of constant additive treatment effects for different individuals is 
required. Thirdly, matching estimators highlight the problem of common support and thus the short-
comings of parametric techniques which involve extrapolating outside the common support (Heckman 
et al., 1998). PSM relies on the assumption that counterfactual outcomes are independent of treatment 
status having conditioned on observable traits – what is referred to in the literature as the conditional 
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independence assumption (CIA).5 As in the case of the OLS estimates, the sensitivity of results to data 
quality is assessed by altering the information set entering estimation and, in particular, the exclusion 
and inclusion of the work history variables.6 
 
We estimate the propensity to be exposed to each HIM variable with a probit estimating a (0,1) variable 
identifying individuals‟ HIM status. The variants of these models which incorporate the work history 
variables are presented in Table 1 and are discussed in Section 5 below. To obtain the effect of 
treatment-on-the-treated for those participants with support we use matching which operates by 
constructing counterfactuals from the non-participants. There are a number of ways of defining this 
counterfactual using the propensity score. We use an Epanechnikov kernel estimator with a 0.001 
caliper which identifies the counterfactual outcome as a weighted average of the outcomes for non-
treated cases within the caliper where the weight given to non-treated cases is in proportion to the 
closeness of the comparator case to the treated case. In estimating the effects of treatment-on-the-
untreated we adopt the identical approach when searching for comparators for the untreated among 
the treated. 
 
In our baseline estimates between 0.2 and 1.0 percent of employees are lost through the enforcement 
of common support, depending on the HIM variable in question and whether we are recovering the 
average treatment-on-the-treated (ATT) or the average treatment-on-the-untreated (ATU). For 
performance-related pay and training the proportion of employees off common support rose when 
conditioning on the work history variables, implying that some cases which appeared to have 
reasonable counterfactuals on the basis of cross-sectional data were, in fact, quite different to their 
matched comparators when one also conditioned on work histories. For example, the percentage of 
employees in receipt of training for whom there was no matched comparator rose from 0.3 percent to 
1 percent when we conditioned on the fuller set of X‟s including work histories. Figure 1 illustrates the 
area of common support. The upper panel corresponds to a probit model where the dependent 
variable is a dummy variable for any HIM practice without work history variables and the lower panel 
to an otherwise similar specification but with work history variables.7 In both cases the treated 
                                                 
5 Matching is thus able to eliminate two of the three sources of estimation bias identified by Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and 
Todd (1998): the bias due to difference in the supports of X in the treated and control groups (failure of the common 
support condition) and the bias due to the difference between the two groups in the distribution of X over its common 
support. The other source of bias is the one due to selection on unobservables. This highlights the importance of the CIA 
since, if this holds, selection on unobservables ceases to be a problem. The appropriateness of the CIA is dependent on the 
richness of the available data. 
6 For a recent paper in the same spirit but with a different substantive focus (namely active labour market programme 
evaluation) see Lechner and Wunsch (2010). 
7
 The latter is the model presented in the first column of Table 1. 
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observations which are off support are largely found in the top end of the distribution of the 
propensity score. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
To be effective, matching should balance characteristics across the treatment and comparison groups. 
Appendix Table A3 presents comparisons of the means in the characteristics used to match HIM and 
non-HIM employees in the case of "any HIM" as the treatment, as well as a measure of the „distance‟ 
of the marginal distributions of relevant characteristics in both groups (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). 
For a given covariate, the standardised difference after matching is defined as the difference of the 
sample means in the treated and matched non-treated subsamples as a percentage of the square root of 
the average of the sample variances in the treated and non-treated groups. Overall, the quality of the 
match seems good, the mean absolute standardised bias for all covariates being 2.8% for the matched 
individuals. Standardised bias for each variable tends to range from –5.8% (secondary school 
education) to +7.3% (university education). For the other treatment variables the biases have a similar 
order of magnitude; the mean absolute standardised biases for profit related pay, training, team work, 
and information sharing are 3.5, 3.2, 2.5 and 3.0 percent respectively.8 As a further indication of the 
quality of the matching, Figure 2 shows the earnings history of the treated and controls before and after 
matching. Matching has clearly succeeded in making the past earnings growth quite similar. Figure 2 
and Table A3 show that the earnings difference which is significant in the unmatched sample becomes 
statistically non-significant in the matched sample. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
There is some debate in the literature regarding the usefulness of reweighting estimators and alternative 
matching estimators (Busso et al., 2009; Froelich, 2004). We test the sensitivity of our results to a 
nearest neighbour matching estimator which minimises the bias across treatment and comparison 
groups at the expense of less efficiency.  
 
The mean difference between the log wages of the treated and untreated employees in the matched 
sample is the point estimate for the „impact‟ of HIM on employees‟ wages. The bootstrapped standard 
error for the post-match difference is based on 1,000 replications.  
 
                                                 
8
 Although achieving a reasonable balance on the X‟s entering the participation equation is an indicator of how good the 
match is on observables, it cannot provide an indication as to whether the CIA is plausible. 
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5.  Results 
Before presenting estimates of HIM effects on employees‟ wages we explore the correlates of 
employees‟ exposure to HIM. Table 1 presents the marginal effects from probit equations for ten 
measures of HIM. Column 1 estimates the probability of having any one of the four HIM practices 
('any HIM') versus having none for the whole sample. Columns 2-5 use the same model specification 
but estimate the probability of exposure to each of the four separate HIM practices, namely 
performance-related pay, training, self-managed teams, and information sharing. The models in 
columns 2-5 are run on subsets of the full sample to ensure those scoring zero on the dependent 
variable are not, in fact, exposed to another HIM practice. For example, the subsample for column 2 is 
either subject to performance-related pay or has no HIM practices at all. Robust standard errors are 
presented in parentheses. Columns 6 to 9 estimate the probability of having between 1 and all four 
HIM practices compared to having none while column 10 estimates the probability of having two or 
more HIM practices (what we term a "High Performance Work System" or HPWS) compared to the 
probability of having no HIM practices. The variables are jointly significant in all models, with pseudo-
R-squared between 0.06 and 0.42. The probit model seems to work best for performance-related pay 
and training, whereas the pseudo R-squared is lower for self-managed teams and information sharing. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Our primary interest is the role of the work history variables. They are jointly statistically significant in 
all ten models. However, the direction of effects for particular work history variables and their 
statistical significance varies by type of HIM practice. As anticipated, past average earnings are 
positively associated with exposure to HIM practices. They are statistically significant for three of the 
four HIM practices, the exception being information sharing. A one standard deviation increase in past 
average earnings over the period 1990-2001 is associated with a 2.2 percentage point increase in the 
probability of working in a HPWS job in 2003. The relationship between rising past earnings and HIM 
exposure is more moderate: a one standard deviation increase in the rate of earnings increase (averaged 
over the periods 1999-2000 and 2000-2001) is associated with a 0.9 percentage point increase in the 
probability of working in a HPWS job in 2003. This effect is statistically significant for three of the four 
HIM practices, the exception being performance-related pay. The finding is consistent with a „reverse 
Ashenfelter dip‟ as discussed earlier. 
 
The work history variables include a number of other markers of worker quality, notably the number of 
months spent in employment in one‟s work history, the number of months spent unemployed, and the 
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number of layoffs experienced. The number of months spent unemployed is negatively associated with 
being in an HIM job by 2003. The effect is statistically significant in the case of performance-related 
pay, training and the HPWS measure. The number of lay off episodes is significantly negatively 
correlated with information sharing and HPWS. We had anticipated that being a stable employee, as 
indicated by number of months in employment, the number of employer switches and the number of 
switches in profession over one‟s working life, might also influence HIM exposure, but this was not 
generally the case. One exception is the positive association between working ten or more years in the 
current job and current exposure to HIM practices: the effect is statistically significant for receipt of 
performance-related pay, information sharing and the HPWS measure.  
 
The literature suggests that HIM practices are most common in larger firms and were pioneered in 
manufacturing (Wood and Bryson, 2009), so we anticipated that experience in larger firms and in 
manufacturing might proxy past exposure to HIM and, thus, increase the probability that the employee 
has an HIM job in 2003. In fact, the results were less clear cut than anticipated. Large firm experience 
was positively and significantly associated with receiving performance-related pay, training and being in 
a HPWS job.9 However, experience of employment in manufacturing was not statistically significant. 
 
These results confirm that employees‟ work histories are a significant predictor of subsequent entry to 
an HIM job. Although the effects do not all point in one direction, there are clear indications that it is 
more able workers – as indicated by past earnings, earnings growth, and „good‟ work histories – who 
are more likely to be found in HIM jobs. A further indication that this is the case is the strong positive 
association between being highly qualified (highly educated) and using HIM practices in one‟s job. 
Indeed, this is the most robust result in Table 1 and is apparent for all but one of the HIM indicators.10 
 
Table 2 presents the effects of HIM on earnings. There are five panels, one for 'any HIM' and one for 
each separate HIM measure. Each panel contains two rows. The first row presents results which 
condition on demographic and employer characteristics only. The second row also incorporates the 
work history variables. Each row contains three columns. The first column presents results from the 
OLS; the second column presents the ATT from the kernel matching estimator; and the third column 
                                                 
9 As one might have anticipated, current employment in a larger workplace and in a multi-establishment firm rather than a 
single-establishment firm, were positively associated with being in an HPWS job, though these results were driven by 
performance-related pay and training.  
10One concern might be that in conditioning on the prior earnings of those who have been exposed to HIM for some time 
we underestimate the impact of HIM on earnings. To address this concern we reran the results we present but truncate the 
earnings histories at 1999, that is, some four years before our survey indicators of exposure to HIM. The results are 
insensitive to this alteration. This, coupled with the fact that HIM wage returns are relatively homogeneous across tenure 
sub-groups (see later) lends credence to our main findings. 
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presents OLS results run solely on the sub-set of cases for which the matching indicates there is 
common support. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Panel A presents the effect of being exposed to any of the four HIM practices on employees‟ wages. If 
one conditions on demographic and current employer characteristics only, being in an HIM job is 
associated with a wage premium of around 21 per cent compared to a „like‟ employee with similar 
characteristics who is not in an HIM job. The ATT effect based on kernel matching is a little higher, 
although the difference is not statistically significant. Running the OLS on the common support makes 
little difference to the results. Row two indicates that conditioning on work history variables leads to a 
reduction in the premium of about one-sixth, a reduction that is statistically significant at a 99 percent 
confidence interval. This is the case for all three estimates.11  
 
A similar pattern of results is apparent in Panels B through E, although the wage returns are somewhat 
higher for performance-related pay and training than they are for self-managed teams and information 
sharing. In each case the difference in the estimated wage returns to these practices with and without 
controls for wage and work histories is statistically significant at a 99 percent confidence interval.  
 
As noted earlier, matching enables us to recover the average treatment effect for the untreated (ATU) 
as well as the ATT. The weighted sum of the two is the average treatment effect (ATE), namely the 
impact that HIM would have on a randomly chosen employee (assuming, of course, that the CIA 
holds). The ATT, ATU and ATE are presented in Appendix Table A4. The table replicates the five 
panels A to E for the HIM variables used in Table 2, with the left-hand column presenting the ATT 
which was presented as the second column in Table 2.  
 
As in Table 2, the effects of HIM on wages tend to be smaller conditioning on employees‟ work 
histories. But what is particularly striking about the results is the similarity of the ATT and ATU in the 
case of "any HIM", performance-related pay and training. The results are somewhat different for self-
managed teams and information sharing. Conditioning on work histories the ATU wage returns to self-
managed teams appear greater than those for the ATT whereas, in the case of information sharing the 
ATT effect is larger than the ATU effect.  
                                                 
11
 To test the implication of the model that the returns to human capital are higher in HIM jobs, we also interacted the 
dummy for the highest education group with alternative indicators for HIM in an OLS estimation. The interaction was not 
statistically significant for any of the HIM variables. 
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[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 3 focuses on the number of HIM practices to which the employee is exposed. This is important 
because, as Appendix Table A2 shows, whereas 77 percent of employees were exposed to at least one 
of the four HIM practices, over half of HIM employees (41 percent of the whole sample) were exposed 
to two or more HIM practices and were thus working in what we term a High Performance Work 
System. The results are striking: the wage returns to HIM rise steeply with the number of HIM 
practices to which the employee is exposed. In all cases the premium falls markedly with the 
introduction of the work history controls, but the difference in wage returns with and without work 
history controls is larger for those exposed to more practices. Having conditioned on work histories, 
the wage premium for a single HIM practice is around 13 percent; 18 percent for two practices; and 25 
percent for three practices. The wage premium for all four practices is even larger, but the number of 
employees exposed to all four practices is very small. The wage premium for employees working in 
HPWS (Panel E) falls by around one-fifth having conditioned on work histories, but it remains sizeable 
and significant at around 20 percent. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The HPWS regimes with two or more HIM practices encompass eleven combinations. Table 4 presents 
the wage premia associated with those HIM bundles which were common enough in the sample to 
permit robust estimation. Five of these eight include training; four include PRP; four include teams; 
and five include information sharing. In each case the association between the HIM bundle and wages 
is evaluated relative to comparators from among the sub-sample who were exposed to no HIM 
practices. The heterogeneity of the effects is striking, ranging from no significant effect in two instances 
(Panels C and F), to premia in excess of 25 percent in two other instances (Panels G and H). 
Employees exposed to performance-related pay but to none of the other three HIM practices, receive a 
wage premium of around 12-14 percent relative to those exposed to no HIM (figures not shown in the 
table). This effect is similar to the combination of performance-related pay and information sharing 
(Panel B). However, the returns to performance-related pay are greater when combined with training 
(Panel A), and are even greater when supplemented with information sharing (Panel G). Contrary to 
predictions in Lemieux et al. (2009) the combination of performance-related pay and team-working is 
not associated with a large wage premium. Indeed, this is one of the two bundles that generate no 
significant wage premium. The wage premium associated with training in isolation is 17 percent (not 
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shown), but combinations incorporating training consistently produce larger wage premia. Exposure to 
either self-managed teams or information sharing in isolation is not associated with a wage premium 
(not shown). When combined (Panel F) they also fail to produce a wage premium. However, their use 
alongside training produces the largest wage premium of all the bundles (Panel H). 
 
Finally, we subject the results presented in Table 2 Panel A (our „baseline‟ estimates for the effects of 
'any HIM') to a number of sensitivity analyses including alterations to the conditioning X‟s (changes to 
the work history, dropping occupational controls), the dependent variable (self-reported earnings, 
hourly earnings, the residuals from a first stage wage equation), employee sub-group analysis (high and 
low educated; high and low earners; long and short tenured; those in small and large plants; private 
sector employees); and the matching estimator. These are reported in Appendix Table A5. The 
overriding impression is just how insensitive the results appear to be to these robustness checks. The 
one exception is Panel K which reports much lower wage returns to any HIM for employees in the top 
half of the wage distribution than for other employees. 
 
6.  Discussion and Conclusions 
There are a number of studies linking HIM to higher wages but, to our knowledge, the evidence 
presented here is the first to account for detailed employee wage and work histories. This proves to be 
important since the results indicate that employees‟ work histories are a significant predictor of 
subsequent entry to an HIM job. Although the effects do not all point in one direction, there are clear 
indications that it is more able workers – as indicated by past earnings, earnings growth, and „good‟ 
work histories – who are more likely to be found in HIM jobs. A further indication that this is the case 
is the strong positive association between high educational qualifications and using HIM practices in 
one‟s job. 
 
We identify a wage premium of around 21 percent before conditioning on work histories and prior 
wages. This falls by around one-sixth when we add in these controls which have been absent in other 
studies. This suggests an upward bias in existing studies in the wage returns to HIM due to positive 
selection into HIM associated with unobserved worker quality.  
 
Although there is some heterogeneity in the wage returns to HIM across types of employee, the 
differences are not particularly striking. Instead, what is notable is the difference in the size of the HIM 
premium across different types of HIM practice. The premium is largest for training and smallest for 
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self-managed teams but what is even more striking is the variance in the wage premium attached to 
different HIM „bundles‟ and the increasing returns to the number of HIM practices used. 
 
If employees are paid their marginal product then the substantial wage premium we identify may reflect 
increased productivity on the part of those workers when exposed to HIM practices. However, the idea 
that HIM practices engender higher labour productivity wherever they are deployed raises the question 
as to why diffusion of HIM across firms has not been as rapid or as widespread as some early 
commentators imagined. One possible explanation is that HIM adoption is optimal such that those 
employees exposed to HIM are the ones able to use those practices to increase labour productivity 
while, in the case of non-HIM employees, firms have chosen to avoid HIM because the productivity 
benefits are outweighed by the costs. The comparison of the ATT and ATU wage returns to HIM are 
illuminating in this regard since the PSM estimated ATT and ATU are very similar in most cases 
implying an incentive on the part of non-HIM employees to take HIM jobs. The fact that they are not 
in HIM jobs may be because they are effectively „rationed‟ by employers (in much the same way as 
union jobs are rationed under Abowd and Farber‟s (1982) model). Employers may choose not to 
deploy HIM despite these predicted wage gains to workers for one of two reasons. The first possibility 
is that the costs of HIM adoption are heterogeneous and, in the case of non-adopters, these costs 
outweigh the labour productivity gains which our wage premium estimates imply. The second 
possibility is that the estimated wage returns to HIM for those not currently exposed to HIM may arise 
for reasons other than labour productivity improvements and, as such, do not proxy the potential 
returns firms may gain through their adoption. To make further progress on this issue one requires 
firm-level data, ideally linked to employee data, to explore heterogeneity across firms as well as 
employees in the costs and benefits of HIM adoption. 
 
Future research on this issue would also benefit from firm-level data to overcome the problem of 
unobservable heterogeneity between HIM and non-HIM firms which may simultaneously affect wage 
setting and the propensity for HIM adoption. Our employee-level data may overstate the effects of 
HIM on wages if, for instance, both HIM adoption and higher wages are a function of firm level 
unobservable traits such as good management. 
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Figure 1. Common support in matching. 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The figures are based on the probits used in Panel A of Table 2. The upper panel 
corresponds to the specification in row 1 while the lower panel corresponds to the specification in 
row 2. 
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Figure 2. The earnings history of the treated and controls before and after matching. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The figures are based on the specification in Panel A of Table 2. Thin lines indicate 95 per cent confidence intervals. 
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Table 1. Work history as determinant of innovative workplace practices. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Any HIM  Any PRP Any training Any self-
managed 
teams 
Any 
information 
sharing 
1 HIM 
practices 
2 HIM 
practices 
3 HIM 
practices 
4 HIM 
practices 
HPWS 
(“more than 
one aspect”) 
Controls           
Individual           
Female -0.0265 -0.0843*** -0.0182 -0.0476 -0.0575** -0.0172 -0.0482* -0.0748** -0.00187 -0.0537** 
 (0.0162) (0.0293) (0.0207) (0.0333) (0.0261) (0.0263) (0.0284) (0.0327) (0.00276) (0.0244) 
Age <=34 0.00391 -0.00274 0.0195 -0.00576 0.0123 -0.00862 0.0161 -0.00733 0.00552 0.0123 
 (0.0233) (0.0429) (0.0287) (0.0462) (0.0371) (0.0378) (0.0399) (0.0461) (0.00629) (0.0342) 
Age 45-54 -0.00266 -0.0237 -0.0104 -0.0105 0.00970 0.00603 -0.0182 -0.0251 0.000178 -0.0139 
 (0.0192) (0.0365) (0.0244) (0.0375) (0.0315) (0.0298) (0.0342) (0.0380) (0.00329) (0.0297) 
Age 55-64 -0.0496** -0.0390 -0.0832** -0.0436 -0.0311 -0.0788** -0.0492 -0.0476 -0.00151 -0.0477 
 (0.0252) (0.0441) (0.0327) (0.0435) (0.0382) (0.0373) (0.0419) (0.0434) (0.00315) (0.0369) 
Married 0.00456 0.0258 0.00852 0.00480 0.0248 -0.0132 0.0302 0.0129 0.00764** 0.0272 
 (0.0159) (0.0301) (0.0204) (0.0323) (0.0262) (0.0246) (0.0287) (0.0319) (0.00382) (0.0248) 
Secondary education 0.0192 0.0105 0.0469* 0.00698 0.0105 0.0195 0.0290 0.0343 -0.000974 0.0315 
 (0.0185) (0.0340) (0.0242) (0.0401) (0.0312) (0.0289) (0.0344) (0.0414) (0.00335) (0.0294) 
Polytechnic education 0.127*** 0.189*** 0.197*** 0.202*** 0.208*** 0.123*** 0.240*** 0.321*** 0.00799 0.232*** 
 (0.0180) (0.0366) (0.0224) (0.0494) (0.0307) (0.0327) (0.0340) (0.0507) (0.00864) (0.0271) 
University education 0.142*** 0.277*** 0.204*** 0.281*** 0.284*** 0.118** 0.297*** 0.438*** 0.0452 0.269*** 
 (0.0189) (0.0444) (0.0224) (0.0705) (0.0314) (0.0468) (0.0379) (0.0658) (0.0378) (0.0268) 
Union member -0.0196 -0.00646 -0.00890 -0.0209 -0.0920*** -0.0120 -0.0538* 0.00184 -0.0121 -0.0397 
 (0.0169) (0.0322) (0.0224) (0.0359) (0.0269) (0.0278) (0.0308) (0.0365) (0.00887) (0.0262) 
Usual weekly hours 0.00317*** 0.00584*** 0.00474*** 0.00577*** 0.00473*** 0.00304** 0.00497*** 0.00881*** 0.000614** 0.00579*** 
 (0.000997) (0.00190) (0.00133) (0.00190) (0.00158) (0.00151) (0.00172) (0.00213) (0.000300) (0.00154) 
Employer           
Plant size 10-49 0.0255 0.116*** 0.0482** 0.0321 0.00207 0.0209 0.0480 0.0801** 0.00377 0.0547** 
 (0.0168) (0.0335) (0.0213) (0.0354) (0.0278) (0.0267) (0.0309) (0.0385) (0.00391) (0.0262) 
Plant size >=50 0.0851*** 0.262*** 0.117*** 0.0934** 0.0612* 0.0826*** 0.141*** 0.167*** 0.0141 0.145*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0348) (0.0232) (0.0421) (0.0316) (0.0303) (0.0336) (0.0440) (0.00883) (0.0283) 
Part of multi-plant firm 0.0597*** 0.178*** 0.106*** -0.0319 0.0474 0.0379 0.135*** 0.0831** 0.00551 0.121*** 
 (0.0173) (0.0310) (0.0221) (0.0374) (0.0289) (0.0277) (0.0317) (0.0373) (0.00502) (0.0269) 
Foreign firm 0.0400 0.0405 0.0697** 0.0639 0.0350 0.0661 0.0545 0.0527 0.00803 0.0457 
 (0.0248) (0.0421) (0.0301) (0.0649) (0.0449) (0.0432) (0.0455) (0.0514) (0.00914) (0.0375) 
Public sector 0.0520** 0.0810 0.107*** 0.0111 0.0449 0.0689* 0.120*** 0.0128 0.0321 0.0896** 
 (0.0229) (0.0510) (0.0295) (0.0504) (0.0381) (0.0376) (0.0430) (0.0565) (0.0254) (0.0364) 
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Work history           
N of job switches  -0.000725 0.00688 0.00196 -0.00131 0.00398 -0.00879 0.00839 0.00819 0.000600 0.00767 
 (0.00506) (0.00957) (0.00633) (0.0100) (0.00836) (0.00815) (0.00881) (0.01000) (0.000781) (0.00760) 
N of employment months 0.000277 -4.03e-05 0.000572 0.000231 0.000504 0.000383 0.000419 0.000628 -1.16e-05 0.000433 
 (0.000307) (0.000587) (0.000384) (0.000514) (0.000451) (0.000484) (0.000504) (0.000560) (4.52e-05) (0.000436) 
N of unemployment  
months 
-0.000807 -0.00237** -0.00194*** -0.00120 -0.000373 -0.000577 -0.00197** -0.00302** -6.25e-05 -0.00202** 
(0.000494) (0.00104) (0.000663) (0.00110) (0.000793) (0.000767) (0.000976) (0.00122) (0.000146) (0.000839) 
Ever worked in the 
manufacturing sector 
-0.0132 -0.0187 -0.0216 -0.0343 -0.00454 -0.0367 0.00651 -0.0571 -0.000938 -0.00901 
(0.0203) (0.0348) (0.0269) (0.0423) (0.0330) (0.0323) (0.0362) (0.0376) (0.00239) (0.0311) 
Ever worked in a firm 
with over 300 workers 
0.0371** 0.108*** 0.0629*** -0.0145 0.0297 0.0236 0.0836*** 0.0895** 0.00231 0.0798*** 
(0.0169) (0.0293) (0.0215) (0.0366) (0.0288) (0.0281) (0.0305) (0.0358) (0.00335) (0.0256) 
N of layoff episodes -0.00769 -0.0197 -0.00584 -0.00621 -0.0270** -0.00155 -0.0245* -0.0182 -0.00820 -0.0225* 
 (0.00712) (0.0130) (0.00924) (0.0155) (0.0131) (0.0112) (0.0140) (0.0171) (0.00502) (0.0117) 
Past average earnings  0.0143* 0.0282* 0.0186* 0.0302* 0.0198 0.0117 0.0263* 0.0222 0.00367 0.0257** 
 (0.00821) (0.0149) (0.0105) (0.0162) (0.0130) (0.0129) (0.0143) (0.0163) (0.00225) (0.0124) 
Past average earnings  
growth 
0.0185 0.0304 0.0343* 0.0565* 0.0384* 0.00112 0.0728*** 0.0366 0.00319 0.0638*** 
(0.0135) (0.0295) (0.0179) (0.0331) (0.0228) (0.0217) (0.0254) (0.0360) (0.00284) (0.0227) 
Worked over 10 years  
with current employer 
0.0455** 0.0810** 0.0385 0.0599 0.0669** 0.0590* 0.0727** 0.0102 0.00308 0.0590** 
(0.0191) (0.0370) (0.0246) (0.0410) (0.0317) (0.0313) (0.0350) (0.0400) (0.00440) (0.0295) 
Had over 3 professions  
over working life 
0.0299 0.0619* 0.0307 0.0319 0.0331 0.0449 0.0319 0.0202 0.00831 0.0337 
(0.0186) (0.0350) (0.0244) (0.0412) (0.0319) (0.0302) (0.0357) (0.0416) (0.00721) (0.0299) 
           
Pseudo R-squared 0.1035 0.2668 0.1580 0.1340 0.1290 0.0611 0.1605 0.2483 0.4239 0.1804 
F-test statistic for work history 
variables 
52.27 58.77 70.48 21.72 34.48 7.44 59.66 35.56 24.56 72.61 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0166 0.0002 0.0064 0.0000 0.0001 0.0062 0.0000 
N 3782 2007 2949 1270 2195 2216 1998 1253 910 2431 
 
Notes: Marginal effects from probit estimations reported. Innovative workplace practices from QWLS 2003 are defined following Kalmi and Kauhanen (2008). Reference category for age is 35-
44 and the one for education consists of those with comprehensive education only. Work history refers to the years 1990-2001. (Past average earnings change is for the years 1999-2000 and 
2000-2001.) The past average annual earnings 1990-2001 are deflated to the year 2000 by using the consumer price index. The estimates in Columns 1-5 are applied in matching in Panels A-E of 
Table 2 while the estimates in Columns 6-10 are applied in Panels A-E of Table 3. All models include 13 unreported industry dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical 
significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2. Innovative workplace practices as determinants of earnings: baseline specifications. 
 
HIM practice OLS ATT OLS (conditional on 
common support) 
Panel A: Any HIM v none (N = 3782)     
Without work history 0.2065*** 0.2173*** 0.2065*** 
 (0.0227) (0.0315) (0.0227) 
With work history 0.1705*** 0.1874*** 0.1722*** 
 (0.0220) (0.0308) (0.0219) 
Panel B: Any PRP v no HIM (N = 2007)    
Without work history 0.2313*** 0.2543*** 0.2320*** 
 (0.0230) (0.0376) (0.0230) 
With work history 0.1887*** 0.2361*** 0.1882*** 
 (0.0223) (0.0399) (0.0223) 
Panel C: Any training v no HIM (N = 2949)   
Without work history 0.2518*** 0.2542*** 0.2519*** 
 (0.0216) (0.0334) (0.0215) 
With work history 0.2093*** 0.2269*** 0.2065*** 
 (0.0210) (0.0350) (0.0209) 
Panel D: Any self-managed teams v no HIM ( N = 1270)  
Without work history 0.2076*** 0.2130*** 0.2088*** 
 (0.0353) (0.0602) (0.0352) 
With work history 0.1652*** 0.1588*** 0.1645*** 
 (0.0340) (0.0610) (0.0339) 
Panel E: Any information sharing v no HIM (N = 2195)   
Without work history 0.2039*** 0.2312*** 0.2021*** 
 (0.0272) (0.0466) (0.0272) 
With work history 0.1667*** 0.2010*** 0.1668*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0430) (0.0262) 
 
Notes: The outcome is the logarithm of register-based annual earnings (2003). ATTs are calculated based on 
Kernel matching (Epanechnikov). ATUs and ATEs are reported in the Appendix (Table A4). Matching is 
performed by using the region of common support for the propensity scores. Caliper is set at 0.001. The 
number of observations refers to OLS and ATT specifications before imposing the common support 
condition. Bootstrap standard errors for ATTs (1,000 replications) in parentheses. For OLS robust standard 
errors reported. Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3. Innovative workplace practices as determinants of earnings: count specifications. 
 
HIM practice OLS ATT OLS (conditional on 
common support) 
Panel A: 1 HIM practice v none (N = 2216)   
Without work history 0.1580*** 0.1451*** 0.1574*** 
 (0.0242) (0.0378) (0.0242) 
With work history 0.1383*** 0.1240*** 0.1381*** 
 (0.0236) (0.0380) (0.0237) 
Panel B: 2 HIM practices v none (N = 1998)   
Without work history 0.2239*** 0.2323*** 0.2238*** 
 (0.0258) (0.0397) (0.0257) 
With work history 0.1777*** 0.2008*** 0.1780*** 
 (0.0254) (0.0404) (0.0254) 
Panel C: 3 HIM practices v none (N = 1253)   
Without work history 0.3000*** 0.3267*** 0.3130*** 
 (0.0289) (0.0561) (0.0275) 
With work history 0.2558*** 0.2360*** 0.2558*** 
 (0.0284) (0.0600) (0.0285) 
Panel D: 4 HIM practices v none (N = 910)   
Without work history 0.4474*** 0.4403*** 0.4161*** 
 (0.0691) (0.1357) (0.0639) 
With work history 0.3576*** 0.3723** 0.2928*** 
 (0.0669) (0.1528) (0.0645) 
Panel E: HPWS (“more than one aspect”) v none (N = 2431)  
Without work history 0.2469*** 0.2657*** 0.2469*** 
 (0.0239) (0.0363) (0.0238) 
With work history 0.1963*** 0.2360*** 0.1969*** 
 (0.0235) (0.0380) (0.0234) 
 
Notes: The outcome is the logarithm of register-based annual earnings (2003). ATTs are calculated based on 
Kernel matching (Epanechnikov). Matching is performed by using the region of common support for the 
propensity scores. Caliper is set at 0.001. The number of observations refers to OLS and ATT specifications 
before imposing the common support condition. Bootstrap standard errors for ATTs (1,000 replications) in 
parentheses. For OLS robust standard errors reported. Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4. Innovative workplace practices as determinants of earnings: specific bundles. 
 
HIM practice OLS ATT OLS (conditional on 
common support) 
Panel A: PRP and training v none (N = 1263)   
Without work history 0.2650*** 0.2647*** 0.2645*** 
 (0.0310) (0.0528) (0.0311) 
With work history 0.2175*** 0.2273*** 0.2149*** 
 (0.0319) (0.0567) (0.0323) 
Panel B: PRP and information sharing v none (N = 974)  
Without work history 0.1731*** 0.1978** 0.1609*** 
 (0.0476) (0.0929) (0.0471) 
With work history 0.1323*** 0.1654* 0.1185** 
 (0.0456) (0.0904) (0.0466) 
Panel C: PRP and self-managed teams v none (N = 882)  
Without work history 0.0398 0.0377 0.0584 
 (0.1335) (0.3263) (0.1169) 
With work history -0.0406 -0.0806 -0.0875 
 (0.1127) (0.2985) (0.0652) 
Panel D: Training and self-managed teams v none (N = 958)  
Without work history 0.1984*** 0.2240** 0.2075*** 
 (0.0410) (0.0822) (0.0377) 
With work history 0.1802*** 0.2087** 0.1851*** 
 (0.0391) (0.0906) (0.0370) 
Panel E: Training and information sharing v none (N = 1332)  
Without work history 0.2417*** 0.2416*** 0.2453*** 
 (0.0323) (0.0629) (0.0320) 
With work history 0.2078*** 0.2106*** 0.2112*** 
 (0.0311) (0.0614) (0.0310) 
Panel F: Self-managed teams and information sharing v none (N = 914) 
Without work history 0.0606 0.0654 0.0665 
 (0.1844) (0.2837) (0.1882) 
With work history -0.0092 -0.0591 -0.0031 
 (0.1813) (0.2602) (0.1819) 
Panel G: PRP, training and information sharing v none (N = 1113)  
Without work history 0.3014*** 0.3358*** 0.3084*** 
 (0.0334) (0.0672) (0.0317) 
With work history 0.2581*** 0.3303** 0.2577*** 
 (0.0332) (0.0886) (0.0319) 
Panel H: Training, self-managed teams and information sharing v none (N = 958) 
Without work history 0.2949*** 0.2807** 0.3042*** 
 (0.0577) (0.1409) (0.0587) 
With work history 0.2708*** 0.2770* 0.2795*** 
 (0.0555) (0.1452) (0.0597) 
 
Notes: The outcome is the logarithm of register-based annual earnings (2003). ATTs are calculated based on 
Kernel matching (Epanechnikov). Matching is performed by using the region of common support for the 
propensity scores. Caliper is set at 0.001. The number of observations refers to OLS and ATT specifications 
before imposing the common support condition. Bootstrap standard errors for ATTs (1,000 replications) in 
parentheses. For OLS robust standard errors reported. Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix  
 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics of the variables. 
 
Variable Average 
Standard 
Deviation Source 
Outcome    
    
Logarithm of annual earnings (2003) 7.5381 0.6971 FLEED 
    
Controls    
    
Individual    
Female 0.5230 0.4995 QWLS 
Age <=34 0.2811 0.4496 QWLS 
Age 35-44 0.2612 0.4394 QWLS 
Age 45-54 0.2959 0.4565 QWLS 
Age 55-64 0.1616 0.3681 QWLS 
Married 0.7506 0.4327 QWLS 
Comprehensive education only 0.1663 0.3724 QWLS 
Sedondary education 0.4381 0.4962 QWLS 
Polytechnic education 0.2800 0.4491 QWLS 
University education 0.1155 0.3197 QWLS 
Union member 0.7911 0.4066 QWLS 
Usual weekly hours 34.2205 7.1307 QWLS 
    
Employer    
Plant size < 10 0.2290 0.4202 QWLS 
Plant size 10-49 0.3725 0.4835 QWLS 
Plant size >=50 0.3985 0.4897 QWLS 
Part of multi-plant firm 0.4217 0.4939 QWLS 
Foreign firm 0.0945 0.2926 QWLS 
Public sector 0.3535 0.4781 QWLS 
    
Work history    
N of job switches 1.7816 1.5464 FLEED 
N of employment months 102.6729 45.1923 FLEED 
N of unemployment months  8.6227 15.9072 FLEED 
Ever worked in the manufacturing sector 0.2470 0.4313 BR 
Ever worked in a firm with over 300 workers 0.2930 0.4552 BR 
N of layoff episodes 0.3041 0.9464 FLEED 
Past average earnings 6.3748 1.5636 FLEED 
Past average earnings change 0.1119 0.4972 FLEED 
Worked over 10 years with the current employer 0.4027 0.4905 QWLS 
Had over 3 professions over working life 0.1423 0.3494 QWLS 
 
Notes: FLEED = Finnish Longitudinal Employer-Employee Data, QWLS = Quality of Work Life 
Survey and BR = Business Register. 
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Table A2. The incidence of different HIM treatment variables. 
 
HIM indicator Mean 
Baseline specifications (Table 2)   
Any HIM 0.7713 
Any performance-related pay 0.3020 
Any training 0.5510 
Any self-managed teams 0.1071 
Any information sharing 0.3517 
  
Count specifications (Table 3)  
1 HIM practices 0.3572 
2 HIM practices 0.2996 
3 HIM practices 0.1026 
4 HIM practices 0.0119 
HPWS (“more than one aspect”) 0.4141 
  
Specific bundles (Table 4)  
PRP and training 0.1052 
PRP and information sharing 0.0288 
PRP and self-managed teams 0.0045 
Training and self-managed teams 0.0246 
Training and information sharing 0.1235 
Self-managed teams and information sharing 0.0130 
PRP, training and information sharing 0.0656 
Training, self-managed teams and information sharing 0.0246 
 
Notes: The base is the whole sample in all cases.  
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Table A3. Test of covariate balancing based on the specification „any HIM v none‟. 
 
 Sample Mean % bias % reduct. 
of |bias| 
t-statistic p-value 
Variable  Treated Control     
Female Unmatched 0.5178 0.5291 -2.3  -0.58 0.5590 
 Matched 0.5182 0.5252 -1.4 38.1 -0.54 0.5930 
Age <=34 Unmatched 0.2641 0.3357 -15.7  -4.11 0.0000 
 Matched 0.2646 0.2701 -1.2 92.4 -0.47 0.6410 
Age 45-54 Unmatched 0.3065 0.2576 10.9  2.76 0.0060 
 Matched 0.3065 0.3152 -1.9 82.1 -0.72 0.4720 
Age 55-64 Unmatched 0.1591 0.1713 -3.3  -0.85 0.3940 
 Matched 0.1588 0.1565 0.6 81.5 0.24 0.8140 
Married Unmatched 0.7594 0.7191 9.2  2.40 0.0170 
 Matched 0.7593 0.7439 3.5 62.0 1.35 0.1780 
Secondary education Unmatched 0.4028 0.5536 -30.5  -7.88 0.0000 
 Matched 0.4033 0.4318 -5.8 81.1 -2.20 0.0280 
Polytechnic education Unmatched 0.3134 0.1667 34.9  8.49 0.0000 
 Matched 0.3134 0.3090 1.0 97.0 0.36 0.7200 
University education Unmatched 0.1346 0.0525 28.5  6.64 0.0000 
 Matched 0.1339 0.1128 7.3 74.4 2.43 0.0150 
Union member Unmatched 0.7988 0.7657 8.0  2.09 0.0370 
 Matched 0.7990 0.8095 -2.5 68.3 -1.00 0.3160 
Usual weekly hours Unmatched 34.6060 33.0380 20.6  5.70 0.0000 
 Matched 34.6120 34.3970 2.8 86.3 1.22 0.2230 
Plant size 10-49 Unmatched 0.3587 0.4173 -12.0  -3.12 0.0020 
 Matched 0.3594 0.3442 3.1 74.1 1.21 0.2270 
Plant size >=50 Unmatched 0.4394 0.2634 37.5  9.35 0.0000 
 Matched 0.4386 0.4553 -3.5 90.5 -1.27 0.2030 
Part of multi-plant  Unmatched 0.4363 0.3741 12.7  3.24 0.0010 
firm Matched 0.4355 0.4491 -2.8 78.1 -1.04 0.2980 
Foreign firm Unmatched 0.1063 0.0559 18.5  4.43 0.0000 
 Matched 0.1052 0.0928 4.6 75.4 1.58 0.1150 
Public sector Unmatched 0.3725 0.2925 17.0  4.31 0.0000 
 Matched 0.3732 0.3625 2.3 86.5 0.85 0.3960 
N of job switches  Unmatched 1.7981 1.7366 4.0  1.02 0.3070 
 Matched 1.7990 1.7656 2.2 45.7 0.82 0.4110 
N of employment  Unmatched 105.8400 92.4350 29.3  7.70 0.0000 
months Matched 105.8000 104.1700 3.6 87.8 1.40 0.1620 
N of unemployment  Unmatched 7.3794 12.8660 -31.6  -8.95 0.0000 
months Matched 7.3746 7.9553 -3.3 89.4 -1.54 0.1230 
Ever worked in the  Unmatched 0.2475 0.2471 0.1  0.02 0.9800 
manufacturing sector Matched 0.2480 0.2564 -1.9 -1933.3 -0.73 0.4640 
Ever worked in a firm  Unmatched 0.3076 0.2448 14.1  3.55 0.0000 
with over 300 workers Matched 0.3068 0.3041 0.6 95.7 0.220 0.8230 
N of layoff episodes Unmatched 0.2689 0.4289 -16.0  -4.35 0.0000 
 Matched 0.2695 0.2886 -1.9 88.1 -0.83 0.4080 
Past average earnings  Unmatched 6.5117 5.9467 35.6  9.45 0.0000 
 Matched 6.5099 6.4844 1.6 95.5 0.65 0.5140 
Past average earnings  Unmatched 0.1086 0.1252 -3.3  -0.86 0.3910 
change Matched 0.1093 0.1012 1.6 51.2 0.65 0.5140 
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Worked over 10 years  Unmatched 0.4329 0.3054 26.6  6.72 0.0000 
with current employer Matched 0.4320 0.4391 -1.5 94.4 -0.54 0.5860 
Had over 3 professions  Unmatched 0.1412 0.1445 -1.0  -0.25 0.8050 
over working life Matched 0.1408 0.1507 -2.8 -197.9 -1.07 0.2840 
 
Notes: Industry indicators not reported. 
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 Table A4. Innovative workplace practices as determinants of earnings: decomposing average 
treatment effect. 
 
HIM practice ATT ATU ATE 
Panel A: Any HIM versus none    
Without work history 0.2173*** 0.2248*** 0.2190*** 
 (0.0315) (0.0396) (0.0272) 
With work history 0.1874*** 0.1882*** 0.1876*** 
 (0.0308) (0.0430) (0.0266) 
    
Panel B: Any PRP v no HIM    
Without work history 0.2543*** 0.2933** 0.2713*** 
 (0.0376) (0.0546) (0.0330) 
With work history 0.2361*** 0.2324** 0.2345** 
 (0.0399) (0.0501) (0.0320) 
    
Panel C: Any training v no HIM    
Without work history 0.2542*** 0.2527*** 0.2538*** 
 (0.0334) (0.0440) (0.0289) 
With work history 0.2269*** 0.1969*** 0.2183*** 
 (0.0350) (0.0448) (0.0295) 
    
Panel D: Any self-managed teams v HIM    
Without work history 0.2130*** 0.2285*** 0.2235*** 
 (0.0602) (0.0634) (0.0489) 
With work history 0.1588*** 0.2020*** 0.1881*** 
 (0.0610) (0.0629) (0.0486) 
Panel E: Any information sharing v no HIM   
Without work history 0.2312*** 0.1963*** 0.2174*** 
 (0.0466) (0.0515) (0.0370) 
With work history 0.2010*** 0.1615*** 0.1854*** 
 (0.0430) (0.0521) (0.0351) 
 
Notes: The outcome is the logarithm of registed-based monthly earnings in 2003. The specifications are the same as 
those in the second column of Table 2. ATT = Average Treatment effect on the Treated, ATU = Average 
Treatment effect on the Untreated and ATE = Average Treatment Effect. ATE is weighted average of ATT and 
ATU. Bootstrap standard errors (1,000 replications) in parentheses. Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
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Appendix A5. Innovative workplace practices as determinants of earnings: various robustness 
checks. 
 
Model specification OLS ATT OLS 
(conditional 
on common 
support) 
Panel A: Using only past average earnings     
to describe work history    
Without work history 0.2065*** 0.2173*** 0.2065*** 
 (0.0227) (0.0315) (0.0227) 
With work history 0.1770*** 0.1953*** 0.1772*** 
 (0.0218) (0.0309) (0.0218) 
Panel B: Including socio-economic status     
in 2000 to describe work history    
Without work history 0.2065*** 0.2173*** 0.2065*** 
 (0.0227) (0.0315) (0.0227) 
With work history 0.1604*** 0.1836*** 0.1608*** 
 (0.0221) (0.0314) (0.0221) 
Panel C: Using the residual from the     
earnings equation as outcome variable    
Without work history 0.2164*** 0.1976*** 0.2164*** 
 (0.0244) (0.0759) (0.0244) 
With work history 0.1738*** 0.1666*** 0.1740*** 
 (0.0239) (0.0290) (0.0239) 
Panel D: Using self-reported monthly wage 
from QWLS as outcome variable 
   
     
Without work history 0.1501*** 0.1750*** 0.1504*** 
 (0.0149) (0.0263) (0.0149) 
With work history 0.1298*** 0.1610*** 0.1307*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0254) (0.0143) 
Panel E: Using hourly earnings as outcome    
variable    
Without work history 0.1670*** 0.1891*** 0.1673*** 
 (0.0160) (0.0268) (0.0160) 
With work history 0.1349*** 0.1611*** 0.1352*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0253) (0.0153) 
Panel F: Estimating separately for the highly     
educated only    
Without work history 0.2212*** 0.2663*** 0.2193*** 
 (0.0366) (0.0314) (0.0373) 
With work history 0.1974*** 0.2193*** 0.1946*** 
 (0.0363) (0.0300) (0.0365) 
Panel G: Estimating separately for the low     
educated only    
Without work history 0.1972*** 0.1823*** 0.1972*** 
 (0.0274) (0.0312) (0.0274) 
With work history 0.1618*** 0.1558*** 0.1621*** 
 (0.0257) (0.0308) (0.0257) 
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Panel H: Estimating separately for those with     
less than 5 years’ tenure    
Without work history 0.1967*** 0.2069*** 0.1972*** 
 (0.0373) (0.0298) (0.0368) 
With work history 0.1756*** 0.1971*** 0.1721*** 
 (0.0354) (0.0309) (0.0354) 
Panel I: Estimating separately for those with     
more than 5 years’ tenure    
Without work history 0.1945*** 0.2047*** 0.1950*** 
 (0.0314) (0.0325) (0.0314) 
With work history 0.1685*** 0.1890*** 0.1686*** 
 (0.0301) (0.0289) (0.0301) 
Panel J: Estimating separately for the bottom     
half of the 2003 wage distribution    
Without work history 0.1371*** 0.1174*** 0.1372*** 
 (0.0313) (0.0314) (0.0313) 
With work history 0.1204*** 0.0927*** 0.1204*** 
 (0.0308) (0.0301) (0.0308) 
Panel K: Estimating separately for the top     
half of the 2003 wage distribution    
Without work history 0.0686*** 0.0862*** 0.0688*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0331) (0.0149) 
With work history 0.0589*** 0.0819*** 0.0592*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0307) (0.0138) 
Panel L: Estimating separately for the private     
sector only    
Without work history 0.1881*** 0.2220*** 0.1910*** 
 (0.0235) (0.0315) (0.0234) 
With work history 0.1556*** 0.2051*** 0.1561*** 
 (0.0231) (0.0300) (0.0231) 
Panel M: Estimating separately for the small     
plants only    
Without work history 0.2129*** 0.2306*** 0.2129*** 
 (0.0304) (0.0304) (0.0304) 
With work history 0.1697*** 0.1878*** 0.1695*** 
 (0.0295) (0.0318) (0.0295) 
Panel N: Estimating separately for the large     
plants only    
Without work history 0.1880*** 0.2009*** 0.1887*** 
 (0.0285) (0.0306) (0.0285) 
With work history 0.1723*** 0.1914*** 0.1707*** 
 (0.0274) (0.0308) (0.0274) 
Panel O: Estimating separately for those who     
have worked 12 months in 2003    
Without work history 0.1777*** 0.2043*** 0.1766*** 
 (0.0244) (0.0304) (0.0244) 
With work history 0.1430*** 0.1728*** 0.1434*** 
 (0.0229) (0.0315) (0.0229) 
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Panel P: Using bias-corrected matching    
Without work history 0.2065*** 0.2017***  
 (0.0227) (0.0230)  
With work history 0.1705*** 0.1687***  
 (0.0220) (0.0220)  
Panel Q: Using nearest neighbour matching    
Without work history 0.2065*** 0.1869*** 0.1953*** 
 (0.0227) (0.0302) (0.0222) 
With work history 0.1705*** 0.1618*** 0.1548*** 
 (0.0220) (0.0301) (0.0210) 
 
Notes: The outcome is the logarithm of register-based annual earnings (2003) except otherwise stated. All 
robustness checks are based on the specification „any HIM v none‟. In Panel B socio-economic status from 2000 is 
taken from FLEED. In Panel C the earnings equation from which the residual has been calculated contains the 
following controls: female, age, married and education. In Panel D the logarithm of self-reported wage from 
QWLS 2003 is based on the midpoints of monthly wage groups (19 groups). In Panel E the outcome variable is 
hourly earnings, calculated based on information from LFS. In Panel F the highly educated sample consists of 
those with at least polytechnic education. In Panel M the small plants are those with less than 50 workers. ATTs 
are calculated using Kernel matching (Epanechnikov) except in Panel P in which bias-corrected matching method 
by Abadie et al. (2001, 2011) is applied and in Panel Q in which nearest-neighbour matching (one-to-one matching 
with replacement) is used. Matching is performed using the region of common support for the propensity scores. 
Caliper is set at 0.001. Bootstrap standard errors for ATTs (1,000 replications) in parentheses. For OLS robust 
standard errors reported. Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
